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1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN
SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
1.1. Introduction
The importance of Switzerland's financial institutions to the inter-
national securities markets makes appropriate a discussion of the Swiss
approach to international judicial assistance. This paper will review the
general workings of the Swiss system as well as the ten years' experi-
ence of application of the United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Treaty),' without limiting the discus-
sion to securities matters. In this respect it will be helpful to briefly
discuss a few principles to which Swiss authorities are bound and to
describe the relationship between the Federal Office in Police Matters
(OFP)2 and the executing magistrate (a judicial authority).3
1.2. Basic Principles
The principle of "dual criminality" 4 is of utmost importance to
judicial assistance. Where the requested assistance can be granted only
through the use of coercive measures, this principle requires that the
conduct giving rise to foreign proceedings must also be punishable do-
mestically.5 Although the existence of dual criminality will be deter-
mined under Swiss law, there is no requirement that legal norms be
identical. This means that if an act is denominated as, for example,
"insider trading" in the United States, assistance may be granted in
* Judge of the Tribunal of the First Instance in Geneva, Switzerland.
** Professor at the Law Faculty of Geneva, Switzerland.
1 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter Treaty].
This central administrative office is part of the executive department.
s For purposes of discussion, this paper will take the example of the "juge
d'instruction" in Geneva.
" The German term is doppelte Strafbarkeit.
' For an illustration of the principle, see Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4.2, 27 U.S.T.
at 2028-29.
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Switzerland even if Swiss law does not define such an offense, so long
as some specific Swiss statute makes the conduct unlawful. However, if
the conduct is punishable only in the requesting state, assistance may
not be granted by the requested state.
Swiss law also embodies the rule of "speciality" which is derived
from extradition practice. Article 5 of the Treaty provides a detailed
explication of this norm and enumerates a list of exceptions to the gen-
eral rule.6 Under this provision the requested state retains full author-
ity to grant or deny the right to use documents obtained through the
Treaty for another independent proceeding. The Swiss national law on
international judicial assistance7 also requires that this rule shall apply
to all foreign requests for judicial assistance.
Several articles of the Swiss Criminal Code' reflect the "protective
principle" as regards Swiss interests. In order to protect higher state
interests, these provisions declare unlawful (1) acts committed in Swit-
zerland by foreign authorities without prior executive consent (for ex-
ample, investigations by foreign police or magistrates) and, (2) disclos-
ure abroad of business or industrial secrets by individuals.
The Swiss Civil Code contains a provision9 calling for protection
of interests related to private life. To achieve this goal, it prohibits dis-
closure of facts or documents related to the "private sphere" of the indi-
vidual or his economic, personal, or professional secrets. Banking se-
crecy can be seen as an extension of this right.
In examining the merits of a case, whether criminal or not, a
Swiss judge has to balance private and public interests. This need arises
whenever the necessity of protecting an individual's or corporation's
private sphere conflicts with the desirability of disclosure in the interest
of the community. This conflict becomes particularly relevant in crimi-
nal investigations. The Treaty embodies this principle by setting forth
very strict conditions under which disclosure of information with re-
spect to an unrelated third party is allowed.'0 Such disclosure is always
subject to the ultimate condition that it be absolutely necessary to carry
out the foreign investigation.
It must be emphasized that these principles are fundamental to
Swiss law. Although they may be questioned under some provisions of
' Id. art. 5, 27 U.S.T. at 2029-30.
Bundesgesetz ilber internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen [Swiss Federal Law
on International Assistance in Criminal Matters], 1982 Recueil systematique du droit
f~dral [RS] 351.1, art. 67 [hereinafter IMAC].
8 This principle is generally established by CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] 4 and more
specifically by CP 271 and CP 273.
9 CODE CIVIL SUISSE [Cc], art. 28.
'0 Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10, 27 U.S.T. at 2035-36.
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the Treaty, they are unlikely to be abandoned.
1.3. Some Particulars of the Swiss System
Since January 1983, international mutual assistance in criminal
matters in Switzerland has been governed by a new law, the Swiss Fed-
eral Law on International Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC)"
which applies to all cases unless an international treaty or convention
provides differently. The procedure governing the handling of a request
submitted by the United States, however, is generally regulated by the
national law of October 1975 implementing the Treaty. 2
The great difference in treatment of a United States request for
assistance and a request originating with another state 3 lies in the role
played by the OFP. In United States matters the OFP has final control
of the procedure and decides on the merits whether or not to transmit
the documents. The local judge or court official is simply in charge of
the formal execution of the OFP's decisions, i.e., hearing witnesses, au-
thenticating documents, and issuing warrants for search and seizure. In
all other foreign requests, the OFP is limited to a much more formal
role. It must screen requests submitted through diplomatic channels,
but the ultimate decision on the merits is reached by the local judge,
subject to a right of appeal to both the cantonal and federal levels.
In both situations, these authorities are bound by their own rules
of procedure. As to matters related to the Treaty or any other form of
assistance, the OFP, as a part of the executive branch, will decide based
upon federal administrative law. Conversely, the local judge'4 will ap-
ply the rules of criminal procedure peculiar to the particular canton in
which he is sitting. This distinction has an important consequence be-
cause all decisions related to coercive measures can be taken only by the
local judge, acting pursuant to the cantonal statute on criminal proce-
dure. The final review of all cases related to judicial assistance is made
by the Federal Supreme Court which, pursuant to the law implement-
ing the Treaty and the IMAC, will review the case under rules of ad-
ministrative procedure.
This dual procedure may result in complications for both the au-
1 IMAC, supra note 7.
12 Bundesgesetz zum Staatsvertrag mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika iber
gegenseitige Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen [Swiss Federal Law on the United States-Swiss
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters], 1977 Sammlung der Eidgenssis-
chen Gesetze [AS] 17 [hereinafter Swiss Law on the Treaty].
13 Such a request might be made under a bilateral or multilateral agreement or
even under the reciprocity provision contained in article 8 of the IMAC, supra note 7.
14 In Geneva, this will be the examining magistrate.
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thorities and the private parties involved in the request, because Swiss
federal administrative law (with a few exceptions such as provisions of
criminal administrative law) does not provide the Swiss administrative
authorities with the power to exert any coercive measures. In a
landmark decision, 5 the Swiss Supreme Court recognized this situation
and affirmed the principle that cantonal authorities must decide under
their rules of criminal procedure. In so doing, the Court confirmed the
dual administrative and criminal nature of Swiss procedure in granting
assistance in international criminal matters. It is, therefore, not surpris-
ing that the OFP, as a member of the executive branch,' 6 has no power
over the local judge, a member of the judicial branch. This suggests
that, in some cases, the delay in handling a request is not the responsi-
bility of the OFP, because the authority of execution is the cantonal
judge. The OFP may only exert pressure on the judge and is precluded
from taking any judicial, administrative, or other measures itself.
The authority handling the foreign request, be it the OFP, or the
local judge, has a legal duty to expedite the request and protect the
rights and interests of Swiss or other non-United States citizens or cor-
porations. This is particularly true when the examination of a non-
United States witness takes place under United States rules of proce-
dure.1 7 In such instances Swiss law requires the local judge to ascertain
that the questions are admissible and do not imperil the rights of the
witness. 8 These factors, combined with the absence of motivation on
the part of local judges who must handle cases they will not fully adju-
dicate, provide serious obstacles to the prompt disposition of requests.
The OFP, however, as an executive authority, has been more receptive
to United States requests.
1.4. Results of Application of the Treaty
Although the number of requests for assistance issued by the Swiss
authorities is not negligible, United States requests are both more nu-
merous and more complex. The numerical disparity is not surprising
considering the incidence of white collar crimes and drug-related of-
fenses, the profits of which tend more often to be deposited in Switzer-
'5 Judgment of Feb. 2, 1972, Bundesgericht, 98 Entscheidungen des Schweizeris-
chen Bundesgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung [BGE] Ia 226.
"6 The OFP acts under a permanent delegation of authority from the Swiss Fed-
eral Council which bears constitutional responsibility for matters related to interna-
tional judicial assistance.
17 Use of the requesting state's rules of procedure is permitted by article 9.2 of the
Treaty, supra note 1, 27 U.S.T. at 2035.
18 Swiss Law on the Treaty, supra note 12, art. 22.
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land by persons acting in the United States than the reverse. As to
complexity, the typical United States request aims at the disclosure of
business secrets (generally bank documents), the hearing of witnesses,
the production of hotel and telephone bills, and similarly detailed mat-
ters. Due to the liberal United States rules governing discovery, a much
greater number of acts will have to take place in Switzerland than
would in the United States if the same request for assistance emanated
from Swiss authorities. Futhermore, an authentication process is always
necessary when documents are produced by a bank or a corporation
even though the procedure specified in Article 18 of the Treaty is sel-
dom followed.19 The reverse, again, is not true. The local Swiss judge
will, of course, be able to delegate part of the investigation to the police
but will have to proceed personally with hearings, searches, and
seizures.
In order to respond to the needs of United States authorities, local
Swiss judges have acceded to requests for methods of discovery, such as
verbatim depositions, voice recording, or videotape recording, for which
Swiss procedural rules make no provision. Although the Treaty pro-
vides for verbatim transcriptions,20 it is silent as to other technical
means. No Swiss canton has a criminal procedure that specifically envi-
sions taking evidence by these technical methods. Nevertheless, in a few
cases local judges (e.g., in Zurich and Geneva) have agreed, with the
consent of witnesses, to take discovery in these unusual ways.
This flexibility reflects the strong good will of Swiss authorities,
particularly the OFP, in rapidly expediting the examination of re-
quests. Delays usually occur at the execution stage or at the appeal
level, specifically when the case is forwarded to the Swiss Supreme
Court. The delay in handling such appeals, however, has decreased
dramatically in recent years.
The issue of what procedural safeguards should control the use
(and prevent the abuse) of local remedies remains a sensitive point.
Under the law implementing the Treaty,2' the person concerned can
first file an objection with the OFP and then appeal to the Swiss Su-
preme Court. It is not clearly established whether the cantonal court of
appeal can examine the merits of the disputed request or can only re-
view the legality of the procedure employed by the local judge in order-
ing a search or seizure. In a recent decision,22 the Supreme Court held
that the cantonal court could examine the merits of the case insofar as
19 Treaty, supra note 1, art. 18, 27 U.S.T. at 2041-42.
20 Id. art. 12.6, 27 U.S.T. at 2038.
21 Swiss Law on the Treaty, supra note 12.
22 Judgment of May 2, 1984, Bundesgericht, 110 BGE Ib 88.
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the OFP had not done so previously, observing that under the Treaty
the OFP usually issues its decision at the start of proceedings. This
opinion is not without ambiguity and could lead to the OFP and the
canton asserting overlapping jurisdiction.
The law implementing the Treaty, therefore, provides opportuni-
ties to delay delivery of the requested documents to the United States
authorities. Requests for the freezing of assets, however, are immedi-
ately executed, notwithstanding any appeal or opposition, in order to
prevent irreparable harm caused by disappearance of the funds. In such
situations the Treaty allows a very swift decision which may be taken
by the OFP (in exceptional circumstances)2" or the local judge. Thus,
the urgency of a matter can be respected, even if the merits of a case
are examined much later, and the United States authorities cannot be
informed immediately of the outcome of their requests. The law imple-
menting the Treaty also provides for an application to a consultative
commission" when Swiss national interests are at stake.25 This cum-
bersome procedure has not been used frequently.
As a practical matter, then, an opposing party can delay the deliv-
ery of requested documents to United States authorities by several
months. It is easy, therefore, to understand the concern of United States
authorities with such delays. This situation is ironic because some of
the remedies provided in the Treaty to protect individual rights were
inserted to conform to United States rules of procedure, particularly
with respect to the constitutional right to remain silent. Moreover, the
Treaty is geared toward granting assistance in important criminal
cases, 26 and it is therefore understandable that strong safeguards exist.
In addition, the Treaty provisions providing for disclosure of business
or professional secrets had to recognize a person's right under Swiss
law to assert that a particular disclosure was unnecessary or even
unlawful.
The position of the Swiss Supreme Court has been favorable to
granting judicial assistance to foreign states, particularly the United
States. Based on the good faith presumption of customary public inter-
national law, its jurisprudence27 shows a total reluctance to review the
23 Where extreme urgency attends a Treaty request, article 8 of the Swiss Law on
the Treaty, supra note 12, permits the OFP to take precautionary measures swiftly.
24 Id. art. 6.
" Under the Treaty a state may refuse to execute a request that it considers
"likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, or similar essential interests . .. .
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3.1(a), 27 U.S.T. at 2028.
26 Articles 6-8 of the Treaty, supra note 1, 27 U.S.T. at 2031-34, contain special
provisions aimed at organized crime.
21 See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 3, 1985, Bundesgericht, 111 BGE Ib 137.
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facts asserted by the foreign state (as in extradition cases). The Court
also takes into account allegations by the party opposing the request
that documents obtained in Switzerland may be used in proceedings
other than those for which assistance was granted. This position stems
from the argument that bad faith on the part of a foreign contracting
state cannot be presumed and that obligations imposed by the Treaty
will therefore be respected (pacta sunt servanda). Furthermore, there is
no principle of res judicata in matters related to international assis-
tance. The Supreme Court has stated that, even if a request could not
be granted, nothing would prevent the foreign state from later proceed-
ing with a new, more complete request. This was particularly true in
the Santa Fe case,28 in which the first request was denied, whereas a
year later a new request was granted.29 In fact, there seem to be very
few cases in which assistance was finally refused, after the OFP ac-
cepted the matter.
The Swiss authorities' presumption in favor of granting assistance
can also be illustrated with reference to fraud in fiscal matters unre-
lated to organized crime. The Treaty does not apply in these cases, and
the IMAC can be used only under the condition (among others) that
reciprocity be granted. Cases have occurred in which assistance was
granted to a United States tax fraud investigation 4ecause the conduct
was rendered criminal by a specific provision of Swiss law although it
did not fall within the list of offenses specified by the Treaty.30 An
example of such conduct would be the creation of a corporation in Eu-
rope with fraudulent bills issued to allow unauthorized payments by a
United States corporation.
Unfortunately, with the exception of cases in which the Swiss
judge travels to the United States and is efficiently assisted there by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the handling of Swiss requests has not
been as expeditious as might reasonably be expected. In fact, the lack of
motivation suggested above exists for the local United States judge or
authority as well. There is the additional reluctance, in some cases, to
grant information that will be used in a foreign proceeding that does
not provide the same procedural guarantees as the one taking place in
the United States in regard to the same matter. These problems are no
less in requests for assistance in civil matters which have been executed
after very long delays. The mutuality of such problems suggests that
28 Judgment of Jan. 26, 1983, Bundesgericht, 109 BGE Ib 47, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 785 (1983).
29 Judgment of May 16, 1984, Bundesgericht.
30 A schedule of offenses for which the Treaty provides compulsory measures ap-
pears at 27 U.S.T. 2064-67.
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they are simply inherent in the mutual assistance process, in which two
judges or authorities act, but only the requesting state is truly con-
cerned with the final outcome of the proceeding.
1.5. Questions Specific to SEC Investigations
In the Santa Fe case, the Swiss Supreme Court had to determine
whether a request originating from the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) fell within the scope of the Treaty. 1 The answer was
not obvious, because under the Swiss system, law enforcement agencies,
with the exception of some specialized federal administrative bodies,32
generally lack independent judicial powers. The Court finally deter-
mined that even if the demand of the SEC did not have as a principal
goal the institution of criminal proceedings, that aspect still existed and
was related to the request. 3 Futhermore, it stated that the formal pres-
entation of the request by the United States Department of Justice ar-
guably satisfied the conditions of the Treaty. 4
The Swiss Supreme Court further ruled that the facts described as
"insider trading" would fall under the provisions of Article 162 of the
Penal Code, provided that the insider had tipped a third party. 5 In this
case, the Court found that the tipper and tippee could have been prose-
cuted in Switzerlafid for disclosure of commercial secrets if the tippee
took advantage of the tip. This decision was not unanimously accepted
by legal commentators, some of whom considered that the conduct was
not yet punishable under Swiss law. In fact, the problem is a serious
one, and it therefore appeared necessary to enact a new provision of the
Penal Code to quiet any doubt. Again, it took a strong cooperative will
to embark on this path.
If the United States definition of unlawful conduct were to change
in the future, however, assistance might not be granted because the
dual criminality test would not then be met. Because it is not contended
that every single transaction on the United States securities market en-
titles the SEC to full disclosure under the Treaty or the Memorandum
of Understanding, 6 a request may be denied in the future if, for in-
stance, the definition contained in Article 162 of the Penal Code or
31 22 I.L.M. at 785.
For example, the Customs Administration has the power to impose fines but
not deprivation of liberty.
3 22 I.L.M. at 785.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 796-98.
36 Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trad-
ing, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter MOU].
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even in the new Swiss regulations on insider trading envisions conduct
different from that described in the request. This raises the difficult
question of the extent to which United States authorities can expect
Swiss authorities to follow their legislative and regulatory changes as
well as new enforcement policies.
There are additional reasons why requests related to insider trad-
ing are not handled as quickly as the SEC would desire. Insider trad-
ing is not (at least for the time being) perceived in Switzerland as a
"crime" in the same sense as more traditional forms of proscribed be-
havior. This perception is prominent not only in legal circles but also
among the general population. Therefore, because the Treaty is geared
to providing assistance in criminal matters, some judges see no reason
to give these cases priority over others, noting that the correct handling
of requests relating to insider trading is very time consuming.
Sometimes, such as in SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (St.
Joe Case),' 7 the request is presented by the United States authorities
several years after the occurrence of the facts. It is then difficult for the
Swiss judge to understand why a particular need for haste still exists
when the recollection of witnesses is already impaired. Finally, al-
though requests made on behalf of the SEC or any other United States
authority are well structured and complete, their scope is often seen as
too broad by the Swiss. For example, when investigating an insider
trading case, the SEC will ask for information on every single trade
made on the United States market through a Swiss bank during the
days preceding announcement of a tender offer, regardless of the num-
ber of shares or options involved. Cases are known where the fortuitous
acquisition of 500 shares (each share's value being fifty dollars) had to
be investigated upon request of the SEC because the order was placed
through a Swiss bank, arguably indicating that it could have originated
from the same tip as other acquisitions made at the same time. It ap-
pears that a more extensive balancing test should take place in order to
avoid investigation of small, insignificant cases involving no wrongdo-
ing. In such instances, assistance is ultimately denied because the bank
demonstrates to the judge that the decision to buy was made by the
bank without its client's knowledge and as a result of normal observa-
tion of the market rather than receipt of inside information. In these
cases, the SEC tends not to be easily convinced that assistance was
rightfully denied. However, even when considering only those requests
made on behalf of the SEC, the record shows that the information
11 SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (con-
cerning refusal of a Swiss bank to reveal the identity of principals for whom it pur-
chased shares of stock and stock options of St. Joe Minerals Corporation).
1987]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
needed was eventually furnished, even if the expected time schedule
was not always met.
1.6. Suggestions for Cooperation
The preceding discussion leads to some broad suggestions for im-
proving the process of judicial assistance between the United States and
Switzerland.
In the future, United States authorities should accept, on its face,
the fact finding process which the OFP conducts through the examin-
ing magistrate, that is, without demanding that the Swiss authorities
support the accuracy of their findings. For instance, in an insider trad-
ing investigation, the statement of the OFP stressing that the operation
has no nexus with the tender offer should be accepted as sufficient. In
the past, the SEC has frequently requested additional documents which
must be edited before transmittal to protect the individual involved. Too
often United States authorities require more from the OFP (and indi-
rectly from an individual who turns out to be innocent) than from the
Commission instituted by the MOU; 8 yet when the Commission denies
a request, United States authorities accept its refusal. The good faith
clause should work both ways, and there should be a simple procedure
instituted under which the OFP could simply declare (and the United
States authorities accept) that the investigation made in Switzerland
leads to a belief that the suspect operation is not unlawful.
Treaty procedures should always be used in preference to unilat-
eral sanctions such as freezing of assets or imposition of daily fines for
contempt of a disclosure order. At the very least it should be agreed
that if judicial assistance is requested (and in particular when it is suc-
cessful), the SEC should refrain from also using a court proceeding in
the United Stateg to put additional pressure on the Swiss bank or cor-
poration. If this suggestion were followed, Swiss banks would tend to
be even more cooperative than they are now. Moreover, such a policy
would respect the spirit of the Treaty, which provides for extensive
assistance, but only under strict, mutually agreed upon rules. Other-
wise, persistence in the application of unilateral pressure may well
achieve a goal opposite to that desired and further delay the receipt of
needed information.
Thinking more generally, if the goal is to prevent manipulation or
unlawful profits when a takeover occurs, it may be more efficient in the
future to enact strict laws regulating market transactions rather than to
38 For a description of the Commission's role, see MOU, supra note 36, art.
111(3), 22 I.L.M. at 4-5.
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penalize the conduct of some insiders. Under the current United States
legal environment, the temptation present in a highly profit-oriented
society makes illegal insider trading almost inevitable. In Switzerland, a
takeover cannot easily occur because the target corporation's board
must approve the sale of registered shares. This requirement represents
a more restrictive approach to market regulation but leaves less oppor-
tunity for fraud.
Despite the problems examined above, the general conclusion
should be a positive one. The United States-Switzerland Treaty was
the first of its kind between countries of common law and civil law
origins, with corresponding differences in procedural systems and
modes of legal thought. The results on both sides are very encouraging,
and the regular increase in the number of requests shows that the coop-
eration is real and certainly has a future.
2. DISCUSSION OF THE HYPOTHETICALS FROM THE SWISS POINT OF
VIEW
2.1. Market Transaction Hypothetical
2.1.1. Actual Possibilities of Judicial Assistance by Switzerland
Judicial assistance in criminal matters is possible only if the facts
alleged by the SEC also constitute a criminal offense in Switzerland. 9
Because insider trading is not itself illegal in Switzerland, assistance
may not be granted. However, if the insider is not trading for his own
account, but rather tips others, assistance may be provided. This is be-
cause the Swiss Criminal Code prohibits officers or other employees of
a company (insiders) from divulging business secrets of that company to
a third party, and prohibits the third party from taking advantage of
the secrets.4" Consequently, the tipper's giving of a tip and the tippee's
taking advantage of it have been considered by the Swiss Supreme
Court to be criminal infractions in Switzerland.
Where insiders trade for their own account, assistance may be pro-
vided through an original system, based upon a private agreement of
the Swiss Bankers' Association (Convention XVI)41 and the MOU 2
" For a discussion of this "dual criminality" principle, see supra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text.
40 Cp, art. 162.
1 Agreement XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association with regard to the Handling
of Requests for Information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
United States on the Subject of Misuse of Inside Information, July 14, 1982, 22 I.L.M.
7 (1983) [hereinafter Convention XVI].
42 MOU, supra note 36.
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entered into between the Swiss and United States governments. This
system seems to function to the satisfaction of the United States author-
ities although it applies only to banks, and not to brokers or other fi-
nancial institutions who did not sign Convention XVI. The Swiss,
however, consider it to be a very exceptional and provisional system
which will be repealed as soon as the new statute on insider trading is
enacted.4 The legal basis of this system is not absolutely certain, and it
is not viewed as a proper way to limit banking secrecy. Particularly
objectionable is the absence in Convention XVI of any provision giving
the bank's client the right to object to release of information concerning
his identity or affairs.
International assistance in civil or administrative matters is not
available in such a case. The present legal system will not be discussed
further here as it will soon be outdated by new legislation.
2.1.2. Judicial Assistance Under the Proposed Statute
In 1985, the Swiss government introduced a new bill on insider
trading,"' which must be passed by both chambers of the Swiss Parlia-
ment to become effective. One chamber has approved the bill,45 and-the
second is about to consider it. It is very probable that it will become
law in late 1988, or at the latest, in 1989. Its very short text would add
one new article (art., 161) to the Swiss Criminal Code.
The text of the bill, as adopted by the first chamber of the Swiss
Parliament (which added paragraph 2bis), presently reads:
Article 161 of the Swiss Criminal Code.
Misuse of confidential information.
1. Anybody who, in his function as member of the
board of directors, officer, auditor (or representative) of
a corporation (or of a corporation controlling it or con-
trolled by it), as member of a public authority, or as a
public officer, or as assistant to them, knows a confi-
dential fact, the disclosure of which can be anticipated
to materially influence the price of shares, other securi-
ties or assimilated "papers" of the corporation or the
price of options related to such securities, traded at the
Stock exchange or "avant bourse""' and secures a profit
's See infra section 2.1.2.
4 1985 Feuille Fdrale II 70.
4 1986 Bulletin Officiel de l'Assemble Fdrale, Conseil des Etats 584-98.
46 "Avant bourse" refers to the trading of stocks by authorized brokers but outside
of the usual market hours.
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for himself or a third party by misusing this informa-
tion, or discloses such fact to third parties and, by doing
so, secures a profit for himself or a third party, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment or to a fine.
2. The third party (tippee) to whom such fact is
disclosed directly or indirectly by one of the persons re-
ferred to in section 1 and who, by misusing such infor-
mation, secures to himself or a third party a profit,
shall be sentenced to up to one year imprisonment or to
a fine.
2bis. The facts referred to in sections 1 and 2
shall include the imminent offering of new shares, a
merger or similar information of equal significance.
3. Sections 1 and 2 apply to both corporations
whose merger is being considered.
4. Sections 1 to 3 apply by analogy when the mis-
used confidential information relates to stocks, other se-
curities or assimilated "papers" or options of a coopera-
tive company or a foreign company."'
After enactment of this bill, Switzerland will be able to grant judi-
cial assistance in practically all insider trading cases. It may be that, in
some particular case, the definition of the Swiss law will not cover the
facts for which the SEC would like to receive information. This would
probably occur only rarely because of the bill's broad definition of in-
sider trading.
In the case of the hypothetical, international assistance undoubt-
edly would be given under the new statute. Resolution of this example
would be easy, because the SEC's request is precise and concerns a
particular and important trading operation. The case would be more
difficult if the request concerned a great number of isolated and possi-
bly small transactions during a certain period, with no clear relation to
an insider operation. In such a case, international assistance should not
be given without some examination of the merits by the Swiss judge.48
2.1.3. Assistance in Learning the Name of the Beneficial Owner
If international judicial assistance is available, the name of the le-
gal owner of the account for which the Swiss bank has made the trans-
action certainly will be provided to the SEC.
7 1986 Bulletin Officiel de l'Assemble F6 drale, Conseil des Etats 584.
48 See supra Section 1.5.
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A problem arises if the nominal owner of the account is a person
acting as a trustee or a nominee. A more difficult problem exists if such
owner is a "shell corporation," incorporated in Switzerland or in some
foreign country such as Liechtenstein, Panama, the Bahamas, or the
Cayman Islands. In both cases, it is to be noted that, in all or most
foreign countries, including the United States, the bank will not always
know the beneficial owner's identity. Indeed, even if the bank knows
such owner's identity, it may decide not to divulge this information as it
was not obliged to know it. Consequently, in most countries, judicial
assistance will not be very useful, if the beneficial owner has been cau-
tious enough to avoid any direct contact with the bank, giving all in-
structions through a nominee or an officer of the "shell corporation."
Switzerland is apparently the only country in the world in which
banks are obliged, in principle, to know who is the beneficial owner of
accounts, especially those of "shell corporations," opened with them.
This obligation is provided by the famous "Duty of Care Agreement" '49
entered into in 1977 between the Swiss National Bank and practically
all Swiss banks. This Agreement expires on September 30, 1987, but
will be replaced by a very similar Agreement between the Swiss Bank-
ers' Association and all Swiss banks. Consequently, as banks will nor-
mally know the beneficial owner of the account, the name of such bene-
ficial owner will be provided to the SEC through judicial assistance.
Remarkably enough, it does not seem that other countries, including
the United States, are taking or requesting similar measures.
Under the Agreement, however, Swiss banks need not identify the
beneficial owner of the account, if the account is opened by an attorney
or a "recognized chartered accountant" acting under professional se-
crecy and attesting that he knows the beneficial owner, who is "fit and
proper." One plausible solution in this situation would be for the Swiss
Judicial Authority to request the attorney or "recognized chartered ac-
countant" to reveal the name of the beneficial owner. An obstacle, espe-
cially for attorneys, lies with the "attorney-client privilege." The pro-
fessional secrecy of attorneys does not, however, allow them to make
commercial or financial transactions for the account of a client and then
refuse to divulge the client's name even in response to a criminal
inquiry.50
"' Agreement Between the Banks Domiciled in Switzerland and the Swiss Bank-
ers' Association, on the one hand, and the Swiss National Bank, on the other hand, on
the Observance of Care in Accepting Funds and on the Practising of Banking Secrecy,
enacted into force July 1, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 767 (1977).
"0 Although contested until recently, this point is now well settled Swiss Law fol-
lowing the as yet unpublished judgment of Dec. 29, 1986 of the Bundesgericht in a case
involving judicial assistance requested by the United States.
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In any case, the scope of this "attorney clause" will be narrowed
in the new Agreement which becomes effective in October 1987. In the
future, attorneys and "recognized chartered accountants" will not rou-
tinely prevent the bank from knowing the real identity of the beneficial
owners of accounts, but will do so only if such action is justified by
their professional activity.
2.2. Disclosure Hypothetical
2.2.1. Particular Characteristics of the Hypothetical
Resolution of this case appears easy, from the Swiss point of view,
because of three characteristics. Firstly, what is alleged by the SEC is
that the profit shown in the last balance sheet of the Swiss subsidiary
was artificially high, because false invoices were made and included in
the accounting. This amounts to making a "forged document," which is
a criminal offense under Swiss law." The case would be much more
difficult if the reason for showing an artificially high profit were differ-
ent. For example, the utilization of "undisclosed reserves" made during
prior years is, at least in principle, permissible and certainly not crimi-
nal under Swiss law. The making of insufficient provisions for proba-
ble future losses is illegal, but not necessarily criminal, in
Switzerland.52
Secondly, information about such forged documents and the result-
ing inflated profit clearly will not jeopardize legitimate business secrets
of either the Swiss subsidiary or third parties. Here again, the problem
would be very different had the allegations concerned insufficient provi-
sions for future losses or other accounting irregularities not involving
forged documents.
Finally, the SEC apparently has full jurisdictional power over the
United States corporation, which is the sole shareholder of the Swiss
subsidiary. Consequently, we assume that the SEC may order the
United States corporation to compel a number of actions by its Swiss
subsidiary, which will allow the information to be supplied.13 Should
the SEC find it lacks the power to so order the parent corporation, it
would do better to obtain expanded powers under United States law
rather than to insist upon obtaining international assistance.
51 Cp, art. 251.
" Such conduct is apparently quite legal in the United States, as illustrated by the
recent example of loans made by United States banks to South American borrowers.
13 See infra Section 2.2.2.
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
2.2.2. Provision of Information by the Subsidiary Without Interna-
tional Assistance
From the Swiss perspective, the easiest solution would be for the
SEC to order the United States corporation to change the directors or
auditors of the Swiss subsidiary. Thereafter, upon request of the SEC,
the United States corporation could, as shareholder, request these new
directors and/or auditors to make an inquiry and present its results to
the general meeting of the shareholders. Such information could be
transmitted to the SEC, as it would not jeopardize legitimate business
interests of the subsidiary itself or of third parties. However, con-
ducting such an inquiry could be difficult if some participants refused
to cooperate.
2.2.3. International Assistance
If the SEC presented a request for international assistance to the
Swiss Government, the request could be granted if considered to be
part of a (possibly future) criminal proceeding in the United States.
However, the Swiss authorities could decide that the whole case should
be considered as a Swiss crime and tried in Switzerland.
2.2.4. Direct Complaint in Switzerland
The SEC could enjoin the United States corporation, as share-
holder, to file a criminal complaint in Switzerland against the (possibly
unnamed) persons who have allegedly made the false balance sheet and
the false invoices. The United States corporation, or at least certainly
the Swiss subsidiary itself, would have access to the criminal files and
could transmit them to the SEC.
3. PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN NA-
TIONAL REGULATORS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
3.1. Institutional Background
In most developed countries the national aspects of financial mar-
kets are decreasing and the international ones are increasing. As a con-
sequence, regulation must take these new international aspects into ac-
count. Therefore, a few proposals have been made for organizing
international cooperation between the different national regulatory au-
thorities of financial markets. This could be done in accordance with
three different models, which are not exclusive of each other:
(1) Such international cooperation could include all countries hav-
ing a national financial market, and possibly even others, for the sake
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of international enforcement. This could be, for instance, the aim of an
organization like the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions and Similar Organizations (IOSCO), with a large (possibly too
large) number of members.
(2) Such international cooperation possibly could be limited to the
nations with the most important financial markets, for example be-
tween ten and fifteen countries. This was apparently the aim of the
Wilton Lask Conference organized in London in December 1986.
(3) In certain cases, such international cooperation could also oc-
cur on a bilateral basis, such as under the Memorandum of Under-
standing entered into between the United States and the United King-
dom in September 1986."'
3.2. Comparison With Cooperation Among Banking Regulators
A similar effort has been made, especially in the last decade, in the
field of banking regulation. Some worldwide cooperation has begun;
four world conferences of banking supervisors have already been organ-
ized.55 The most developed organization is the so-called "Cooke Com-
mittee, '' 56 in which twelve countries have cooperated for more than
twelve years.57
Some efforts at bilateral cooperation have also taken place. A
striking recent example is the agreement of January 1987 between the
United States and the United Kingdom on the capital ratios of banks.58
3.3. Scope of Cooperation
Probably the most important question raised by international co-
operation of financial market regulators is determination of its proper
"' Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United Kingdom Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Securities and Between the United
States Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the United Kingdom Department
of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, United States-
United Kingdom, 25 I.L.M. 1431 (1986).
" This corresponds to model (1) in Section 3.1.
5' See Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations: Evolving Tech-
niques for Cooperation Among Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC.
REG. 244 (1981) (describing establishment of the Committee and discussing its
functions).
5' This corresponds to model (2) in Section 3.1.
5' Agreed Proposal of the United States Federal Banking Supervisory Authorities
and the Bank of England on Primary Capital and Capital Adequacy Assessment, re-
printed in 52 Fed. Reg. 5119, 5135-39 (1987). The Federal Reserve Board has pro-
posed changes to its capital guidelines that would bring them into accord with this
agreement. Id. at 5119-35.
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scope.
Most previous efforts have been directed toward cooperation in the
two traditional fields of SEC regulation. The first such field is mandat-
ing disclosure of relevant information both as to new issues and on a
continuing basis. The second concerns the prevention and sanction of
fraud including insider trading and manipulation. In today's conditions
this approach appears too narrow to effectively protect either investors
or the system of international financial markets.
A second model aims at the regulation of financial intermediaries
such as investment banks and broker-dealers. This concept recognizes
that private (as opposed to institutional) investors normally deal
through financial intermediaries in which they have confidence. Such
investors do not want protection beyond that represented by the finan-
cial strength and reliability of their broker or banker. The regulation of
financial intermediaries aims at insuring that they develop and apply
proper rules of conduct and disclosure, that they maintain proper capi-
tal ratios, and that investors have a proper means to resolve their com-
plaints. Regulation in the United Kingdom follows this approach with
the recent passage of the Financial Services Act.5"
A third, more comprehensive model would be to organize interna-
tional cooperation for the regulation of all financial markets including
banking, securities issues, secondary markets, and possibly other finan-
cial services. Such an approach certainly is intended to protect inves-
tors. But it is also, and perhaps mainly, intended to protect the smooth
functioning of the international financial markets; this is important for
investors as well as for international economic stability.
The vice-president of the Swiss National Bank has recently pro-
posed this last approach. Although more ambitious, it could be more
realistic and more efficient than the first two methods. In particular,
international cooperation among financial regulators should avoid the
conflicts which often arise between different authorities within a given
national regulatory system (banking authorities, securities authorities,
commodities authorities, insurance authorities).
3.4. Proposals for Bilateral Swiss-United States Cooperation
International cooperation of financial regulators should, in princi-
ple, be organized on a multinational basis. The sponsors of this Confer-
ence have, however, requested that some ideas be explored regarding
possible bilateral cooperation. The following proposals relate to the bi-
lateral approach with particular emphasis on relations between Swit-
"' Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60.
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zerland and the United States.
Both countries could agree to establish a bilateral "Contact and
Consultative Working Group on the Regulation of Financial Markets."
Such a Working Group would have no legal power and its existence
would imply no obligation on the part of the two governments. The
authorities of both states could submit to the Working Group cases re-
lated to the regulation of financial markets and affecting Swiss-United
States relations. The Working Group would seek the best way to re-
solve such cases in a spirit of mutual cooperation and understanding of
the legal systems and traditions of the two countries. This implies that
both countries must accept that the aim of cooperation is to achieve
some compromise and not merely to create another means of enforcing
national regulation internationally.
In accordance with the third model described in Section 3.3, the
Working Group should not limit its activities to the problems tradition-
ally addressed by the SEC (namely disclosure and market frauds). Its
activities should encompass the regulation of financial intermediaries
including banks. In short, it should be competent to examine any case
relating to the regulation of financial markets.
The proposal of such a Working Group may be seen as too ambi-
tious and ineffective. It may be that it will not cope with some SEC
needs and requests as quickly as the SEC would wish. However, the
Working Group should be organized so as to be able to examine with
reasonable dispatch the cases put to it. In the long run such a Working
Group could be very useful for the bilateral relations between Switzer-
land and the United States in financial matters. It could even serve as a
model for the bilateral or preferably multilateral cooperation of other
countries in this field.
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